The U.S.-Israel war with Iran has been a tough one for Saudi Arabia.
Already grappling with economic pressures, the Saudis have been forced to cut spending and extend timelines for major projects that were supposed to be physical manifestations of the kingdom’s transformation. The Public Investment Fund will now focus its attention on alternative energy, advanced manufacturing, logistics, water and renewables, tourism, and Neom, the futuristic city the Saudis are constructing along the country’s northwestern coast. Also, in what should be a surprise to no one in light of the current conflict, Riyadh will continue to invest in its own defense industrial base and diversify its weapons procurement. Saudi authorities are planning to pull the plug on Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s upstart golf league and have already sold off 70 percent of the country’s prized Al Hilal soccer club.
The U.S.-Israel war with Iran has been a tough one for Saudi Arabia.
Already grappling with economic pressures, the Saudis have been forced to cut spending and extend timelines for major projects that were supposed to be physical manifestations of the kingdom’s transformation. The Public Investment Fund will now focus its attention on alternative energy, advanced manufacturing, logistics, water and renewables, tourism, and Neom, the futuristic city the Saudis are constructing along the country’s northwestern coast. Also, in what should be a surprise to no one in light of the current conflict, Riyadh will continue to invest in its own defense industrial base and diversify its weapons procurement. Saudi authorities are planning to pull the plug on Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s upstart golf league and have already sold off 70 percent of the country’s prized Al Hilal soccer club.
Regarding the war itself, the Saudis got a public relations black eye in late February, when the Washington Post reported that Mohammed bin Salman—like Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—had lobbied U.S. President Donald Trump to attack Iran. The Saudis denied it. A few weeks later, when Trump was claiming that the war would be over in a few days, the New York Times reported that the crown prince was once again lobbying the president, this time to finish the job against Tehran. Again, the Saudis denied it. Yet, despite insisting publicly that it did not want the war, had nothing to do with Operation Epic Fury, and supports a diplomatic solution to the conflict, Saudi Arabia has taken consistent fire from Iran and its proxies in Iraq. In response, the Saudis have declared that they “reserve the right” to shoot back but so far have opted not to pull the trigger.
This is not to suggest that Saudi Arabia should get into the fight, but it is revealing that a country that billed itself as a rising power and the most important country in the Middle East is betwixt and between when its neighborhood is burning down. The Saudis clearly have interests at stake, but rather than taking action, they have been issuing strongly worded statements while others, including their adversaries, are shaping the region. It seems that Riyadh would be better off taking concrete taking steps to protect its interests. What is the saying about it’s better to be at the table than be the meal?
To be fair, the Iran war is complicated for the Saudis. Having made a trillion-dollar bet on their economic transformation, Saudi leaders want nothing more than regional stability. From their perspective, no one seems to be helping: not Hamas, not Syria, not the United Arab Emirates, not Iran, and especially not Israel and the United States. Confronted with the fact that Riyadh’s closest partner, Washington, has destabilized the region (along with Israel), the Saudis have been trying to figure out how best to protect themselves under circumstances beyond their control that will likely result in one of three outcomes.
The first is a stalemate: Trump grows tired of the conflict and declares a U.S. win without converting tactical gains into strategic victory while U.S. forces stay in the region and sanctions on Iran remain in place. This would not be the worst outcome for the Saudis, though they would likely remain under Iranian drone and missile threat.
The second is a genuine U.S. victory, which would range on a continuum from Iran being no longer able to threaten its neighbors to full-on regime change. This is the best possible outcome for Saudi Arabia (and others in the region).
The third possible outcome is also the worst one: an Iranian victory defined as sanctions relief, a role for Tehran managing the Strait of Hormuz, the survival of the regime, and a U.S. withdrawal from the region.
Each of these scenarios is possible, but by the way the Saudis have approached the conflict so far, it seems they are discounting the chances of a U.S. victory in favor of either stalemate or Iranian victory. That is why they are walking the finest of fine lines, denying they were in favor of the war from the beginning, running away from reports that they do not want Trump to end hostilities prematurely, and periodically threatening the Iranians with retaliation but never actually making good on those threats.
This duck-and-cover way of dealing with the region was supposed to be something of the past for Saudi leaders. As tempting as it is to suggest that this is a matter of old habits dying hard, it is more accurate to highlight the rather awkward position the Saudis find themselves. Saudi Arabia is not as strong and influential as its rhetoric suggests, leaving it dependent on the United States, which has joined Israel in trying to change the Middle East. Mohammed bin Salman might agree with the goal but not the way the United States and Israel have gone about achieving it. Under these circumstances, Riyadh is trying to be all things for all possible outcomes.
Given the stakes—Vision 2030 and all that goes with it are at risk—the Saudis would be better off if they got out from under their own muddle and took an actual position on the war. It would be something along the lines of: Iran is a threat to Saudi security; Saudi Arabia has sought rapprochement, but the Iranians have not lived up to their end of the bargain; Riyadh preferred to take a long view and hoped that the brotherly and sisterly Iranian people would rid themselves of the regime; the Saudi leadership did not advocate for this conflict, but the Iranians have attacked the kingdom and threatened its economic well-being; Saudi Arabia will participate in a naval effort to open the Strait of Hormuz and will retaliate against Iran for attacks on the kingdom. Some Saudis will likely quibble with this or portray it as warmongering. But they also want to be perceived as strong, influential, and capable of shaping the region. If so, how is Riyadh doing that?
No doubt Saudi Arabia is mad about what the United States and Israel have done. Up until Feb. 28, the region was not exactly stable, but it was manageable. Now the United States and Israel have unleashed forces that they cannot control. The Saudis will add Operation Epic Fury to their long list of half-cocked things Washington has done that have empowered Iran, including the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the nonresponse to Iran’s attack on Saudi oil facilities in 2019, and others. The Iran war will soon become part of the standard Saudi harangue of Americans, and no one should blame them for it. The decision to go to war was reckless.
Still, the best way to blunt the fallout from Trump’s ill-advised adventure is to take a clear stand on the issue, assume some risk, and take responsibility for it. The Saudis seem incapable of doing this. Instead, they are demonstrating that they are not in the same league with either the Israelis or the Iranians.
