Nearly two centuries after U.S. President James Monroe warned European powers against intervention in the Western Hemisphere, the United States again finds itself confronting a geopolitical challenge in the region. In the last two decades, China has dramatically expanded its economic, technological, and strategic presence in Latin America and the Caribbean. But today’s environment differs fundamentally from that of the Monroe Doctrine.
The Monroe Doctrine was a strategy of exclusion: It sought to keep external powers from establishing territorial and political control in the Western Hemisphere. That framework does not reflect the realities of 21st-century competition. China is not expanding its influence in Latin America through conquest or occupation. Instead, Beijing has embedded itself into the region’s infrastructure, trade networks, energy systems, digital ecosystems, and strategic industries.
China exercises its influence less through force than economic integration, technological dependence, and structural leverage. It is now a leading trade partner in the region, a major source of financing, and an important market for commodities and agricultural exports. For many Latin American governments facing persistent infrastructure deficits, sluggish growth, and chronic underinvestment, engagement with China is not ideological—it is an economic necessity.
The United States cannot realistically exclude China from Latin America. Nor should it attempt to force governments in the region into binary choices between Washington and Beijing. Most countries in the hemisphere simply seek diversified economic relationships and greater strategic autonomy.
Not all forms of Chinese engagement carry equal strategic significance. Rather than reflexively opposing all Chinese commercial activity in Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States should selectively compete to displace Chinese influence in sectors that carry the greatest geopolitical and national security consequences. For Washington, this means moving from strategic denial to what I call strategic displacement.
First, the United States must prioritize strategic infrastructure. Chinese firms have expanded their presence across ports, logistics corridors, transportation hubs, and energy systems throughout the hemisphere. These assets are not just commercial enterprises. They shape trade flows, supply chain access, maritime connectivity, and strategic mobility. Control over critical infrastructure and commerce can create enduring forms of political and economic leverage.
The Chancay port in Peru, which opened in 2024, illustrates this dynamic. Developed largely by Chinese shipping giant Cosco, the port is designed to connect South America more directly to Asian markets while deepening China’s role in Pacific trade corridors and regional supply chains. The United States can’t simply oppose such projects—it must provide Latin American countries with more competitive financing and infrastructure alternatives.
Second, the United States must compete more aggressively in digital infrastructure, telecommunications, and data governance across Latin America. Chinese tech firms such as Huawei and ZTE have become deeply embedded in telecommunications infrastructure, cloud systems, surveillance technologies, smart-city initiatives, and digital payment platforms throughout the region.
These systems are not politically neutral. They shape data governance standards, create potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and may eventually expand opportunities for Chinese intelligence collection and political influence operations. Venezuela’s Chinese-supported “fatherland card” system, developed with assistance from ZTE, offers an extreme example of how digital systems can evolve into instruments of political surveillance and social control.
Third, Washington must turn its growing attention to critical minerals into a sustained hemispheric strategy. Latin America possesses enormous reserves of lithium, copper, rare-earth elements, and other minerals essential for advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, energy technologies, and defense systems. China has already positioned itself across extraction, processing, and transportation networks tied to these resources, particularly in the so-called lithium triangle of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile.
The United States should focus on financing bankable projects in countries where market conditions make partnership viable, such as Argentina and Chile, while supporting processing, refining, and offtake agreements that keep more of the value chain within the hemisphere. The objective should not be simply access to raw materials but resilient mineral supply chains that reduce dependence on Chinese-controlled processing and logistics.
Fourth, the United States should treat hemispheric energy resilience as a strategic priority. Chinese state-linked firms have expanded investments in electricity transmission, renewable energy, oil production, and broader energy infrastructure throughout the region. In Lima, Peru, for example, Chinese firms hold dominant positions across electricity generation, transmission, and distribution systems.
Though many of these projects may be commercially rational in isolation, collectively they deepen Beijing’s role in sectors that are critical to national resilience and long-term economic development.
Fifth, the United States must pay greater attention to space and dual-use infrastructure throughout the hemisphere. Chinese investments tied to satellite systems, aerospace cooperation, artificial intelligence, and advanced telecommunications may support legitimate commercial objectives while also expanding Beijing’s strategic access and intelligence capabilities.
A Chinese-operated deep space facility in Neuquén, Argentina, illustrates the ambiguity surrounding many of these projects. Though formally civilian, the station’s limited transparency and ties to China’s military-linked space apparatus have generated persistent concerns among U.S. and regional officials.
U.S.-China competition in Latin America is not primarily ideological—it is structural. For too long, the United States has oscillated between neglect and alarmism in the region. Its approach has been incoherent, framing nearly all Chinese activity as threatening while failing to scale credible U.S. economic alternatives. That strategy misunderstands the nature of Chinese statecraft and the economic and development pressures facing governments across the region.
Take Bogotá’s new Chinese-built metro system. The United States has viewed the project through the lens of geopolitical competition. Yet the project’s links to China are unlikely to determine the hemispheric balance of power. Washington too often treats this kind of isolated commercial dispute as though it constitutes a strategic victory while neglecting sectors that carry greater long-term consequences.
The United States should focus less on blocking symbolic Chinese-backed infrastructure projects and more on competing aggressively in the sectors that shape long-term strategic resilience.
China’s advantage in the Western Hemisphere doesn’t stem solely from lower costs or faster infrastructure delivery timelines. It comes from Beijing’s ability to align financing, diplomacy, industrial policy, and corporate activity behind long-term geopolitical objectives. The United States does not need to replicate China’s state-capitalist model, but it does need a coordinated framework to encourage U.S. companies to compete in sectors with strategic consequences for national security.
This strategic displacement will inevitably face constraints. Countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Chile are not passive arenas for great-power competition; they possess their own national interests, development priorities, and conceptions of strategic autonomy. Many Latin American governments resist frameworks that appear to force binary geopolitical alignment or revive perceptions of U.S. paternalism.
Brazil, for example, increasingly sees itself as an independent global actor pursuing diversified partnerships with both Beijing and Washington. China is Brazil’s largest trading partner and a major investor across the agriculture, energy, infrastructure, and technology sectors.
Similar dynamics exist in much of South America. Any U.S. strategy built around outright exclusion of China will fail politically and economically. Moreover, Beijing will not simply vacate strategic space: It has invested decades building commercial relationships, financial dependencies, diplomatic influence, and institutional presence throughout the region.
If Washington wants U.S. firms to compete more effectively in critical sectors across Latin America, it must reduce the financial and political risks associated with long-term investment in the region. That means more aggressively leveraging institutions such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, and other public financing mechanisms to catalyze private-sector engagement.
Most importantly, the United States must reengage the hemisphere economically with seriousness and consistency. For many countries in Latin America, Chinese influence expanded because the United States was absent, inconsistent, or overly securitized in its approach to the region. Countries across the hemisphere are not looking to become geopolitical battlegrounds. They are seeking investment, modernization, and reliable long-term partnerships.
The United States still retains enormous advantages over China in Latin America and the Caribbean: geographic proximity, deep cultural ties, educational networks, private-sector innovation, financial depth, and long-standing democratic partnerships. Capitalizing on those advantages requires competitive statecraft, not reactive rhetoric.
