By all reasonable standards, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has been a massive strategic failure. After four years and at the cost of substantially more than 1 million Russian casualties, Moscow controls slightly less than 20 percent of the territory of Ukraine, of which it already conquered 7 percent when it grabbed Crimea and the eastern Donbas in 2014.
But Putin is in no mood to concede failure and accept a ceasefire. He’s counting on his army to succeed where it has failed so far, on the Trump administration to pressure Kyiv into accepting Russia’s core demands, and on the Europeans to get tired of the war and stop supporting Ukraine.
By all reasonable standards, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has been a massive strategic failure. After four years and at the cost of substantially more than 1 million Russian casualties, Moscow controls slightly less than 20 percent of the territory of Ukraine, of which it already conquered 7 percent when it grabbed Crimea and the eastern Donbas in 2014.
But Putin is in no mood to concede failure and accept a ceasefire. He’s counting on his army to succeed where it has failed so far, on the Trump administration to pressure Kyiv into accepting Russia’s core demands, and on the Europeans to get tired of the war and stop supporting Ukraine.
As of now, none of Putin’s three avenues forward looks likely to succeed. Most Europeans have recognized Ukraine’s war of defense as Europe’s own. Were Putin to succeed in conquering Ukraine, he might well be tempted to continue in an effort to unravel the entire European security structure. But if Ukraine survives as an independent and sovereign nation, it would severely constrain his strategic options.
There were fears during the first year of war that European support would gradually decline, that key states could seek accommodation with Moscow, and that Ukraine would be left on its own. But support hasn’t waned. European countries in different configurations—including the European Union, the Nordic-Baltic-Ukraine coalition, and the so-called coalition of the willing—have not only continued their massive financial and military support but largely replaced U.S. aid since the start of the second Trump administration.
Loans and grants from EU institutions accounted for almost 90 percent of the financial and humanitarian flows in 2025. A handful of European countries, in particular Germany, Britain, and the Nordic countries, accounted for about 95 percent of military aid last year. A recent EU loan arrangement of 90 billion euros, along with other funds, effectively finances the Ukrainian state through 2026 and 2027. Despite all the doubts four years ago, Europe has stepped up.
How Europe commits to Ukraine’s future security is likely to take different forms. There will be some presence of forces in Ukraine itself, as well as financial and other help in strengthening Ukraine’s defense. For all the rhetoric surrounding U.S. and European security guarantees, the most important one will be Ukraine’s own ability to defend itself. Here, European support will be especially crucial.
No one can predict when the guns will fall silent. There will be some arrangements—perhaps only temporary ones—between Russia and Ukraine. The Kremlin might try another big offensive this year, like similar failed attempts in 2024 and 2025. But at some point, Putin will have to concede that continuing the war will achieve nothing more than further weakening Russia.
Initially, Donald Trump sought to achieve a ceasefire. But in Putin’s private meetings with Trump in Anchorage, Alaska, he managed to change Washington’s position. The Trump administration has since been pressuring Ukraine to accept the Kremlin’s territorial demands.
Essential for the security of Europe is therefore Europe’s own support of Ukraine—during the war and afterward, when the country will have to be stabilized and rebuilt. Peace in any genuine sense of the word can only come when Vladimir Putin has left the Kremlin and Ukraine has entered the European Union.
