U.S. President Donald Trump’s Operation Epic Fury achieved nothing strategically. In typical Roy Cohn fashion, the president has declared victory. But the reported terms of the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding tell a different story. It seems that Washington and Tehran will now negotiate over Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will be able to export oil under a special waiver for 60 days, and the Strait of Hormuz will reopen. The last issue remains murky, however. Although Trump has triumphantly declared freedom of navigation in the strait—a return to the prewar status quo—Iranian officials claim that this only applies to the two months covered in the MOU. Thereafter, they will impose a fee for transit.
Why exactly did the United States fight this war? Based on what is known about the agreement, Americans, U.S. partners in the region, consumers around the world, and possibly even long-suffering Iranians were better off before the United States and Israel launched their war on Feb. 28. Over the weekend, Trump stated that if Iran did not honor its commitments in the MOU, the United States would be the “guardian of the Middle East.” In fact, Trump’s failure in Iran is likely to trigger something else altogether: a U.S. withdrawal. It is not just the president who is likely to use the MOU to disengage Washington from the Middle East. There are few members of Congress, presidential candidates, government officials, and would-be government officials who will now want to spend the political, military, and financial resources to stay. The circumstances are different, but it feels like December 1971 all over again.
U.S. President Donald Trump’s Operation Epic Fury achieved nothing strategically. In typical Roy Cohn fashion, the president has declared victory. But the reported terms of the U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding tell a different story. It seems that Washington and Tehran will now negotiate over Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will be able to export oil under a special waiver for 60 days, and the Strait of Hormuz will reopen. The last issue remains murky, however. Although Trump has triumphantly declared freedom of navigation in the strait—a return to the prewar status quo—Iranian officials claim that this only applies to the two months covered in the MOU. Thereafter, they will impose a fee for transit.
Why exactly did the United States fight this war? Based on what is known about the agreement, Americans, U.S. partners in the region, consumers around the world, and possibly even long-suffering Iranians were better off before the United States and Israel launched their war on Feb. 28. Over the weekend, Trump stated that if Iran did not honor its commitments in the MOU, the United States would be the “guardian of the Middle East.” In fact, Trump’s failure in Iran is likely to trigger something else altogether: a U.S. withdrawal. It is not just the president who is likely to use the MOU to disengage Washington from the Middle East. There are few members of Congress, presidential candidates, government officials, and would-be government officials who will now want to spend the political, military, and financial resources to stay. The circumstances are different, but it feels like December 1971 all over again.
In January 1968, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced that the United Kingdom would be withdrawing its forces from the Persian Gulf. Britain could no longer afford what was left of its global empire, including forward bases in the Gulf. The Johnson administration tried to talk Wilson out of his plan to no avail. British forces completed their withdrawal “East of Suez” in December 1971. So began the long and slow buildup of U.S. forces in the region. At first, the United States remained decidedly offshore with an aircraft carrier, visiting the Indian Ocean periodically to show the flag alongside a modest naval “presence operation” based in Bahrain. It was not until Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait in August 1990 that the United States came ashore and basically stayed.
The U.S. track record over the ensuing 35 years was not good. Washington set out to build a Palestinian state, transform Iraqi society, and make Middle Eastern countries democracies. None of it worked, and neither did Trump’s Iran gambit. For all these reasons, the Middle East is not a winning issue in Washington. If there is bipartisan agreement inside the Beltway, it is on the need for the United States to disentangle itself from the region.
The free flow of energy resources from the region was long Washington’s prime directive in the Middle East, but that seems to be changing as well. It seems unlikely that the global economy can be decarbonized, but Democrats want to invest in an energy transition because it is good for the planet and it is a way out of the Middle East. At the same time, many Republicans are seemingly wondering why Washington should continue to be the guarantor of security and stability in the Gulf when the United States is the largest producer of oil and gas in the world. In this environment, and when political forces in the United States encourage elected leaders to look inward, spending untold billions of dollars to rebuild, repair, or replace U.S. facilities and equipment in the region because of a misbegotten and unpopular war is a tough sell. There is a decent chance that the future will look a lot like the past—with a U.S. aircraft carrier rotating through the region, a residual naval presence in Bahrain, and perhaps an air wing based in Jordan. That is not nothing. But it seems clear to at least some U.S. policymakers that the Carter Doctrine and the Reagan Corollary to it are dead. Trump’s folly just reinforced that sentiment. As a result, the American era in the Middle East is ending.
And what will Washington’s partners do as Trump bids them farewell with the support of his domestic adversaries? In 1971, leaders in the Gulf privately wanted Washington to establish a presence in the region, but today there is no successor to the United States. Beijing has learned a good lesson of Washington’s adventures in the Middle East and seems determined to ensure that it does not similarly get wrapped round the axle of the region. U.S. partners will no doubt want to buy more weapons from the United States, but they are also likely to expand their universe of suppliers. After all, it makes little sense to continue buying $4 million U.S. missiles to intercept drones that cost $35,000. This is especially so if the United States is withdrawing and leaving the Gulf states and others with the mess Trump created. If Washington is not obligated to them, they should not be beholden to Washington for weapons systems, especially the ones that seem ill-suited for the evolution of warfare. The likely beneficiaries will be China, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and even Israel, some of which already supply military equipment to the region, including drone, anti-drone, and air defense technology.
Trump often inflates his initiatives by describing them as something “no other president” has done. When it comes to Iran, he is quite correct. His predecessors looked at the Iran challenge, reviewed battle plans, felt the pressure from Israeli leaders, but ultimately said no to a foolish war. Trump fell for it. Now he can correct course by doing something else no U.S. president has done: withdraw the United States from the Middle East. No doubt, some countries will be sad to see Washington go. But U.S. partners in the region know by now that the United States was never the steward of stability and security it claimed to be. The high-water mark was Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, which were more than three decades ago.
So, the Saudis, Bahrainis, Qataris, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Jordanians, Egyptians, and Israelis who made up the U.S.-led regional order, you are now on your own. Good luck.
This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage. Read more here.
