Without a collective approach from African states, China’s tariff-free market access will not be the silver bullet many expect, write Ronak Gopaldas and Priyal Singh in ISS Today.
China’s decision to extend tariff-free access from 1 May to all African countries, barring Eswatini (with which it maintains no diplomatic ties), has been widely welcomed across the continent. At a moment when global trade is fragmenting and protectionism is rising, Beijing’s move appears to offer a rare expansion of market access.
Yet beyond the positive optics lies a more pragmatic reality in which Beijing’s long-term strategic interests may simply reinforce existing trade dynamics.
At first glance, the timing of Beijing’s decision invites comparison with Washington’s decisive weaponisation of tariffs to reshape supply chains, counter its rivals, and reassert its economic dominance even among traditionally close allies.
While Washington has increasingly used tariffs as a coercive tool, China is positioning itself as a committed and reliable trading partner. For African policymakers who have struggled to adapt to the shock of America’s tariffs, this distinction matters. Predictable, rules-based market access, once taken for granted, has become an increasingly scarce commodity.
Despite this, Beijing’s announcement probably wouldn’t drastically alter Africa’s trade with China immediately. It’s even less likely to spur the export diversification and industrialisation that most African states want.
This is because around 70% of African exports to China were already entering the Chinese market duty-free before 1 May. Some estimates place this figure higher when considering the composition of least developed country exports, heavily concentrated in primary commodities.
Recent analyses on this zero-tariff policy’s impact on South Africa, for example, point to modest export gains (up to 1.3% of the existing trade base in an optimistic scenario), and that will largely come on the back of trade diversion – not new demand.
While not ruling out longer-term benefits, this decision serves more as a geostrategic signal. It allows Beijing to consolidate its image as Africa’s favoured international partner compared to the impulsive, coercive behaviour of President Donald Trump’s second administration. These optics matter as they shape expectations, allegiances and geopolitical alignments.
The decision is unlikely to fundamentally augment the continent’s trade winners and losers. It will rather reinforce existing patterns.
Africa’s largest exporters to China, including Angola (oil), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (copper and cobalt), Zambia (copper) and South Africa (minerals and agricultural goods), are already deeply embedded in Chinese supply chains.
They benefit from scale, established logistics networks, and long-standing commercial relationships with Chinese buyers. Removing tariffs, even if modest, further enhances their competitiveness and consolidates their market position.
However, the policy will likely most tangibly impact price-sensitive agricultural sectors, where products like sesame seeds, coffee and avocados compete in tight global markets and small cost shifts influence sourcing decisions.
Tariff elimination could create openings for countries like Ethiopia and Kenya to expand exports, supporting modest diversification of Africa’s export base. However, as Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa Executive Director Trudi Hartzenberg notes, while agriculture could benefit most from China’s industrial competitiveness, duty-free access alone won’t yield significant gains.
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to trade will remain critical in determining effective market access. Existing memoranda of understanding covering products like table grapes, stone fruit, apples and avocados – which address SPS requirements and value chain standards – will likely remain central to trade flows.
The deeper structural constraint, however, remains unchanged: Africa’s trade with China is still overwhelmingly characterised by the export of raw materials and the import of finished goods, despite a concerted push in recent years to prioritise investment and industrialisation.
Tariff-free access, in isolation, does little to address this stubborn imbalance. Moving up the value chain into processing, manufacturing and higher-value agricultural exports requires complementary investments in infrastructure, industrial policy and human capital.
Transforming this relationship and levelling the trading playing field will require more coordination among African states and accompanying agreements with China on the various structural factors that underpin their trade ties. These range from commodity demand cycles to infrastructure financing and foreign investment to logistics and value-chain integration.
David Luke, Professor in Practice and Strategic Director at the London School of Economics and Political Science’s Firoz Lalji Institute for Africa, affirms this view. He says given the ‘economic asymmetries between China and African countries reflected in China’s massive trade surplus, non-reciprocal zero tariff market access makes sense.’
But it should be ‘accompanied by Chinese investment in productive sectors [like] manufacturing, agricultural production and agri-value chains [to realise] transformative impacts on African economies.’
Nonetheless, from Beijing’s perspective, the logic behind tariff-free market access for most African states is clear. First, it strengthens China’s position as Africa’s principal economic partner, reinforcing decades of engagement under frameworks like the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, while pulling African states into a closer geopolitical orbit – particularly as Washington retreats.
Second, the policy helps secure supply chains for critical resources. As global competition intensifies, access to minerals like cobalt, lithium and copper has become vital. Africa, which holds a significant share of the world’s reserves of these resources, is central to this equation. Ensuring stable, long-term access is a core priority for Beijing, and trade policy is one lever among many to achieve this.
Third, deeper trade integration creates downstream opportunities for Chinese firms. As African economies become more closely linked to Chinese markets, the business case for Chinese investment in local infrastructure, logistics and manufacturing strengthens. This aligns with the broader trajectory of the Belt and Road Initiative, which has increasingly emphasised industrial parks, special economic zones, and value-added production in Africa.
Yet this growing interdependence raises important questions for African policymakers. Greater access to the Chinese market is undoubtedly beneficial, but on whose terms, and to what end? Without deliberate strategies to promote industrialisation and diversify exports, Africa’s simple role as a supplier of primary commodities may become more entrenched.
The challenge, therefore, is not simply to take advantage of tariff-free access, but to leverage it strategically. This could involve targeted support for sectors with higher value-added potential, investment in processing capabilities, and negotiations to align standards and regulations that facilitate export diversification.
It also requires a clear-eyed assessment of how trade policy intersects with the broader geopolitical competition between America and China as the locus of global power shifts ever eastwards.
Tariff-free access is not a silver bullet. It is an opening that must be matched by equally ambitious domestic and regional efforts for it to translate into meaningful economic transformation.
Ronak Gopaldas is Signal Risk Director and a Consultant at the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and Priyal Singh is a Senior Research Consultant at ISS and Signal Risk Geopolitical Analyst
This article was first published by ISS Today.
