As much as the world has focused on the United States’ shifting foreign policy since the second inauguration of Donald Trump, the geopolitical effects of the Russia-Ukraine war have been constant. His predecessor, Joe Biden, sought to align U.S. allies in a “latticework” of overlapping alliances and partnerships to deal with the challenges presented by Russia in Europe and China in Asia. He urged Asia to take more interest in European security and the NATO allies to do more in the Indo-Pacific.
Trump appears uninterested in a grand Eurasian coalition. Instead, he insists that allies take responsibility for their own security amid Washington’s new focus on the Western hemisphere. That has produced the same imperative as before: more collaboration among U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.
As much as the world has focused on the United States’ shifting foreign policy since the second inauguration of Donald Trump, the geopolitical effects of the Russia-Ukraine war have been constant. His predecessor, Joe Biden, sought to align U.S. allies in a “latticework” of overlapping alliances and partnerships to deal with the challenges presented by Russia in Europe and China in Asia. He urged Asia to take more interest in European security and the NATO allies to do more in the Indo-Pacific.
Trump appears uninterested in a grand Eurasian coalition. Instead, he insists that allies take responsibility for their own security amid Washington’s new focus on the Western hemisphere. That has produced the same imperative as before: more collaboration among U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.
The fear of abandonment by the United States is nudging allies and partners to beef up their own defense capabilities and explore greater collaboration, whether with or without Washington conducting the Eurasian orchestra. Each in his own way, Biden and Trump have accelerated the emergence of an increasingly interconnected Eurasian geopolitical theater.
The Biden years saw the United States’ Asian allies attend the annual NATO summits. Japan sought to mobilize Asia in defense of Ukraine on the grounds that standing up for Kyiv’s sovereignty is also about defending Asia against Chinese territorial expansion. South Korea’s growing defense capabilities now contribute to Eastern Europe’s security. Russia’s side of the war has seen a similar Eurasian alignment. China became a more active supporter of the Kremlin’s ability to sustain its military misadventure in Ukraine. North Korea not only provided a large part of Russia’s artillery munitions but also sent troops to fight with Russian forces.
Eurasian integration is no longer an abstraction. Since Trump returned to office, Europe has accelerated its effort at economic diversification with a special focus on the Indo-Pacific. New trade initiatives with Australia, India, and Indonesia stand out. Europe is also rebooting security partnerships with major Asian partners. For example, it has agreed to promote new defense industrial collaboration with New Delhi that is expected to reduce India’s dependence on Russian weapons.
The return of geopolitical thinking to Europe—after decades spent sneering at realism and power politics—will also have to address a more difficult challenge: how to address the consequences of Trump’s quest for better U.S.-Russia relations. As Europe continues to provide defense and economic support for Ukraine and develops its deterrent capabilities against Russia, it risks ceding diplomatic engagement with Moscow to Washington.
A similar challenge awaits Asia as Trump seeks “respectful relations” with China while still promising a robust defense of the first island chain facing China’s eastern seaboard. China is a more dominant presence in Asia than Russia is in Europe. Most Asian countries are more than eager to pursue stable ties with Beijing given its economic heft—even as they hope that Washington’s security commitment to Asia remains solid. While Asian partners pray that Trump will not be tempted into accommodating China in the region, they would want to hedge by expanding ties with other Asian states and European partners.
A shift in Washington’s strategy and the prospect of improved U.S. ties with Russia and China will increase the incentive for deeper cooperation between Europe and Asia. What we might be witnessing is a phase when the United States remains a key actor in Eurasia, but Europe and Asia learn to do more with each other on an equal basis, rather than a return to a very unequal past. Russia’s war in Ukraine and Trump’s new approach to the region have profoundly altered the geopolitical calculus of both Europe and Asia.
