The United Kingdom will see its seventh prime minister in just over 10 years when Andy Burnham enters 10 Downing Street on July 20.
The last time Britain changed prime ministers at such a rate was between 1827 and 1834, when Parliament debated and implemented the Slavery Abolition Act. This time, the culprit is Brexit. The 2016 Brexit referendum, in which the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, has caused much political and economic instability. Ten years later, six of Burnham’s predecessors have failed to deliver on the promises made by Brexit’s supporters, leaving many voters feeling misled by the Leave campaign. Numerous studies estimate that Brexit has devastated the U.K. economy, reducing its GDP per capita by 6 percent to 8 percent.
The United Kingdom will see its seventh prime minister in just over 10 years when Andy Burnham enters 10 Downing Street on July 20.
The last time Britain changed prime ministers at such a rate was between 1827 and 1834, when Parliament debated and implemented the Slavery Abolition Act. This time, the culprit is Brexit. The 2016 Brexit referendum, in which the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, has caused much political and economic instability. Ten years later, six of Burnham’s predecessors have failed to deliver on the promises made by Brexit’s supporters, leaving many voters feeling misled by the Leave campaign. Numerous studies estimate that Brexit has devastated the U.K. economy, reducing its GDP per capita by 6 percent to 8 percent.
In the post‑Brexit era, many prime ministers have leaned into Washington. The U.S.-U.K. Economic Prosperity Deal was meant to offset some of the loss of access to the EU single market. But a bilateral, transactional arrangement with the U.S. has failed to fully replace the dense market and political embedment of EU membership.
In his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has treated the U.K. more as a subordinate to be bullied than as one of Washington’s closest allies. When Trump requested U.S. access to U.K. bases for operations related to Iran, Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s initial refusal prompted Trump’s sneer, “This is not Winston Churchill that we’re dealing with.” He has publicly humiliated Starmer ever since.
Starmer has tried to build a friendship with Trump: inviting him for an unprecedented second state visit in 2025 and publicly defending and justifying some of his Ukraine and NATO policy choices before the Iran strikes. It seems that no matter what Starmer does, under the United States’ 47th president, the “special relationship” feels more abusive than fond.
In response to this humiliation, Burnham should learn from Starmer’s mistakes in dealing with Trump. Here, adopting Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s approach would help: employing disciplined messaging, institutional coalition‑building, and being prepared to stand up to Trump’s bullying.
The signs are encouraging. Burnham’s first public expression of his foreign policy came in an op-ed for the Times. Despite saying the United States remained a vital partner on defense and security, Burnham focused more on EU economic and strategic cooperation, calling for “even closer” relations with the continent.
One immediate and unavoidable diplomatic flash point Burnham will have to manage with Trump is the Chagos Islands. Despite initially giving his support, Trump has now called Starmer’s decision to transfer sovereignty of the Chagos Islands back to Mauritius an “act of great stupidity.” Today, Washington opposes the transfer, signaling it wants secure control over the Diego Garcia military base, and even suggesting it might seek to purchase the island.
Burnham should hold his ground. Returning the Chagos Islands would end one of the longest-running territorial disputes in Britain’s remaining overseas territories and represent a long-overdue act of decolonization. It would also abide by the International Court of Justice’s opinion, which deemed the U.K.’s separation of the Chagos archipelago from Mauritius in the 1960s to be unlawful.
Learning from Starmer’s errors, Burnham should set out key foreign-policy goals from the outset, with a focus on three interlocking priorities: transparent defense spending, reorienting the economy toward the EU, and preparing for a major provocation by Russian President Vladimir Putin as his war in Ukraine falters.
On defense, Burnham plans to raise spending to 2.7 percent of GDP by the end of the decade. He must keep that promise and increase the minimum to at least 3.5 per cent to unite his cabinet and the Labour Party; it was Starmer’s inability to commit to 3 per cent that triggered Defense Secretary John Healey’s resignation in June. This resignation was the culmination of a series of policy and commitment U-turns by Starmer, which led to the cabinet and Labour Party losing confidence in his premiership.
Burnham must find a way to effectively explain to the public how Brexit has damaged Britain economically and geopolitically over the past decade. He is already planning a summer tour of deprived areas hit by government policy and could use this as a chance to open a national dialogue on Brexit’s impact and how to restore Britain’s economic growth. This will lay the groundwork for rebalancing the economy toward the EU and rejoining the single market. Better cooperation with the EU, in turn, will enable Burnham to distance himself from Trump and avoid depending on the United States for trade and growth.
As recognized by the country’s National Security Strategy, Russia is now among the U.K.’s top adversaries. Russia’s hybrid war includes cyberattacks and airspace incursions by Russian bombers over the North Sea, assassination attempts, electoral meddling, and sanctioned Russian “shadow fleet” oil tankers transiting the English Channel, which the Ministry of Defense has described as a threat to the UK.
Burnham must prepare for these measures to escalate as Putin lashes out against Ukraine’s supporters. He should position the U.K. to take a lead on Euro-Atlantic security by using the “coalition of the willing” to exchange modern warfare insights and establish a continental protection program against Russia based on Ukraine’s experiences. Burnham should work with the U.S. to enhance North Sea defenses, an area where there is a real convergence between London and Washington. This will help strengthen European defense deterrence, as well as that of the United States, especially following reports of Russian attack submarines and other vessels operating in the U.K.’s exclusive economic zone earlier this year.
Rebalancing Britain’s foreign policy will be difficult and slow. Burnham must strike a careful balance between cooperation and autonomy: reassuring allies and defending national interests. He should learn from his six predecessors just how strategically vulnerable Brexit has left the United Kingdom, and he must pursue diversified partnerships with the United States and the EU until strategic autonomy is restored. Such autonomy would be significantly accelerated by rejoining the EU single market and ultimately the EU.
