The ongoing U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran is as much about perceptions and internal politics as it is about battlefield success, yet much of the public discourse and even expert debate rests on observable military actions rather than the opaque decision-making processes that shape them. Tehran’s strikes, Washington’s signaling, and Israel’s operational tempo offer clues—but only partial ones—about how each side understands the conflict and its trajectory. The most consequential drivers of escalation, restraint, and negotiations remain hidden inside leadership circles, intelligence channels, and regime calculations that outsiders can only infer imperfectly.
Here are five critical unknowns about Iran (though one could easily write another dozen on the United States and Israel) that highlight the limits of current analysis and underscore the risks of miscalculation in a crisis where the most important variables are largely invisible.
The ongoing U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran is as much about perceptions and internal politics as it is about battlefield success, yet much of the public discourse and even expert debate rests on observable military actions rather than the opaque decision-making processes that shape them. Tehran’s strikes, Washington’s signaling, and Israel’s operational tempo offer clues—but only partial ones—about how each side understands the conflict and its trajectory. The most consequential drivers of escalation, restraint, and negotiations remain hidden inside leadership circles, intelligence channels, and regime calculations that outsiders can only infer imperfectly.
Here are five critical unknowns about Iran (though one could easily write another dozen on the United States and Israel) that highlight the limits of current analysis and underscore the risks of miscalculation in a crisis where the most important variables are largely invisible.
Who is really in charge of Iran?
Iran’s political system has long been a complex mix of formal and informal power, with elected officials, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), leading clerics, and Iran’s supreme leader all shaping national security decisions. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei led Iran, but he did so in part by balancing different factions and power centers.
The war, however, has decimated much of this leadership. By its own count, Israel has killed more than 250 senior Iranian leaders, including Khamenei, the commander of the IRGC and numerous senior IRGC figures, the defense minister, and many others. Khamenei’s son Mojtaba was chosen as the new supreme leader, but his control is uncertain. It has been reported that the airstrike that killed his father injured him, perhaps severely, and he has not been seen in public. Even without these injuries, he would need time to consolidate power; his father took years to do so.
Today, it is not clear if Mojtaba Khamenei is a leader or a figurehead. Either way, the relative strength—and viewpoints—of the different factions that made up Iran’s deep state is also unclear. Iran’s regime today is probably more conservative and hostile to the United States, with younger IRGC figures empowered. How that general characterization (if true) translates into specific outcomes is unclear.
How well is information flowing in the Iranian system?
We also don’t know what sort of information Iranian leaders—whomever they may be—are receiving about the damage Iran has sustained and inflicted, the resolve (or lack thereof) of the Trump administration, the attitudes of key outside powers such as China, and the resolve of their own people. Even in democratic systems in peacetime, it is difficult to provide accurate intelligence to policymakers, and this problem is magnified in authoritarian systems, where no one wants to bring bad news to the dictator.
These problems are magnified in a time of war. Because of the Israeli assassination campaign, Iranian leaders cannot regularly meet or communicate without risking further attacks. This makes it hard for them to develop a common threat picture and understand what’s working and what isn’t.
Does Iran really think it has won?
Now that the shooting has been put on hold, Iran’s leaders seem to be walking tall, issuing demands to end long-standing sanctions and declaring that they will impose tolls on ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran found an effective way to impose heavy costs on the United States by attacking U.S. allies in the Gulf and stopping traffic in the strait. The speaker of Iran’s parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, taunted Americans on X recently, noting that they may soon be “nostalgic” for $5 a gallon gas.
But Iran has suffered staggering losses. The United States and Israel have destroyed much of its military and more than half of its missile launchers, in addition to killing many of its leaders. Iran’s bridges, ports, and other critical infrastructure have been bombed, with Iranian officials estimating the damage from the war at $270 billion.
It is in Iran’s interest to claim it is winning, just as it is in U.S. President Donald Trump’s interest to say “we won.” Given Iran’s poor information flows, this may lead some leaders to misperceive how well things are going for them. Iran may be bluffing, but it may also believe, wrongly, that it can make expansive demands at the negotiating table without the risk of resumed conflict.
How much can Iran escalate?
Both the United States and Iran are threatening to inflict more pain should the conflict resume. But Iran’s ability to do so is uncertain. Historically, Iran has mixed aggression and caution, trying to subvert its neighbors and spread its influence when it sensed weakness but usually pulling back when it neared the brink of open conflict. Tehran’s battered military still can threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz with a mix of mines, drones, and small boats, but the growing U.S. military presence in the region—including more Marines and special operations forces—allows the United States to push back, including with a presence on the ground, if the Trump administration is willing to risk escalation.
Nor has Tehran used international terrorism, despite its long history of backing terrorist groups and using terrorism to punish its enemies around the world. Such strikes would enable Iran to inflict pain directly on the United States as well as supportive allies. Iran, however, may lack the capability to launch these attacks due to a U.S.-led disruption campaign, and Tehran may fear such attacks would backfire.
Does the regime fear internal unrest?
In late December and January, Iran’s clerical regime faced the most serious demonstrations in its history. To regain control, the regime slaughtered thousands of peaceful protesters. One U.S. and Israeli goal at the start of the war, now seemingly abandoned, was regime change in Iran.
Today, even as the regime nervously eyes the United States and Israel, it must also fear its own people. Iran has arrested, and even executed, regime opponents in the latest round of fighting.
This concern can push Iran in different directions. Additional economic pain would increase criticism of the regime and make sanctions relief vital, strengthening U.S. leverage. At the same time, it is politically hard for a weak regime to make concessions, such as abandoning the nuclear program, without admitting that all of Iran’s pain and suffering could have been avoided by a more accommodating stance before the war began.
Uncertainties about leadership authority, informational integrity, perceived success, escalation thresholds, and domestic vulnerability are not peripheral; they are the core determinants of how the war may evolve.
Strategies built on confident assumptions about Iranian decision-making are likely to be brittle. Misreading who holds real authority could lead to ineffective deterrent signals. Underestimating information distortions within the regime could produce false expectations about rational restraint. Taking claims of victory at face value—or dismissing them entirely—risks misunderstanding Iran’s willingness to continue or expand the conflict. Most dangerously, misjudging escalation thresholds or the regime’s sensitivity to internal unrest could trigger actions that produce precisely the outcomes the United States and Israel seek to avoid.
A more prudent approach is to treat these five questions not as analytical gaps to be quickly filled (although doing so would be desirable) but as enduring uncertainties to be managed. This requires humility, continuous reassessment, and a willingness to hedge against multiple plausible interpretations of Iranian behavior. In a conflict where the most decisive factors lie behind closed doors, the greatest risk is not what we fail to see but what we assume we already understand.
