On April 17, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Ikazuchi transited the Taiwan Strait. It was the second such passage by a Japanese warship in 10 months, yet Beijing’s response was far harsher this time. Relations between Beijing and Tokyo have degenerated sharply since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments last November that Japan could come to Taiwan’s defense if China attacked.
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, and Eastern Theater Command all put out statements condemning Japan after the April transit, telling it to “step back from the brink” and warning it to “return from the wrong path,” while Jun Zhengping, a People’s Liberation Army-linked social media account, warned that Japan was playing with fire. At the same time, the Eastern Theater Command launched combat readiness patrols in the East China Sea and sent warships near Okinawa.
On April 17, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Ikazuchi transited the Taiwan Strait. It was the second such passage by a Japanese warship in 10 months, yet Beijing’s response was far harsher this time. Relations between Beijing and Tokyo have degenerated sharply since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s comments last November that Japan could come to Taiwan’s defense if China attacked.
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, and Eastern Theater Command all put out statements condemning Japan after the April transit, telling it to “step back from the brink” and warning it to “return from the wrong path,” while Jun Zhengping, a People’s Liberation Army-linked social media account, warned that Japan was playing with fire. At the same time, the Eastern Theater Command launched combat readiness patrols in the East China Sea and sent warships near Okinawa.
Beijing does not intend to let Japan off lightly. It is using the incident to push the crisis one step further. If this continues, then the possibility of a limited air or naval clash within the next year or two, or even a small-scale exchange of fire, cannot be dismissed as alarmism.
Why did Beijing react so strongly to the Ikazuchi incident? One reason is the timing. April 17 is the anniversary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed after Japan’s victory in the first Sino-Japanese War—a date China regards as a symbol of national humiliation. Tokyo may well have been unaware of the symbolism of the date, but Beijing is unlikely to believe that.
But that is not enough to explain China’s reaction. A more immediate backdrop is the unresolved anger over the incident in March when a Japan Ground Self-Defense Force junior officer broke into the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, allegedly at one point carrying a knife. Beijing remains deeply dissatisfied with Tokyo’s handling of that episode, believing Japan has neither adequately responded to China’s anger and concerns nor offered an apology. With those feelings still raw, Japan then sent a warship through the Taiwan Strait. In Beijing’s eyes, this was not an isolated act but a direct provocation directed at China’s security concerns and diplomatic dignity.
At a deeper level, however, what has truly alarmed Beijing is the change in Japan’s stance on Taiwan. There are plenty of long-standing disputes between Japan and China, from the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to the controversy over the Yasukuni shrine and museum and Japan’s strong ties to Taiwan. By describing an invasion of Taiwan as a potentially critical situation for Japan that could, under the country’s constitution, justify military action, Takaichi pushed the latter issue to the forefront of the relationship.
China has repeatedly singled out Takaichi not because it sees the boundaries of Japan’s China policy being pushed forward. Her remarks were not an isolated episode. Since she took office, Japan’s diplomatic language, political positioning, and military deployments have all moved in the same direction. The new diplomatic bluebook lowers China’s standing, signaling a political cooling of the relationship. Japan is accelerating the deployment of long-range strike capabilities on its own territory that could reach China.
Japan is also deepening security support for the Philippines and taking part in joint exercises with the United States and the Philippines, embedding itself more deeply in the regional architecture aimed at constraining China. Any one of these steps could be described as defensive. Together, however, they point to a clear strategic intention: Within the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific framework, Japan is preparing to play a more active role in balancing against China.
There is no question that the U.S.-China rivalry remains Beijing’s primary focus. But in terms of immediate security, Japan may be a larger risk. Precisely because the U.S.-China conflict’s scope is so large, both sides know the cost of losing control would be enormous, which makes them more cautious. China and Japan are different. They are geographically much closer and burdened by far heavier historical memories. The Diaoyu/Senkaku waters, the Taiwan Strait, Okinawa, and the waterways among Japan’s southwestern islands are all high-risk zones.
Hostility between China and Japan is far more easily amplified by history and nationalist emotion than hostility between China and the United States. De-escalating in these circumstances is increasingly difficult. The old model of cooperation mixed with friction will be hard to return to.
China’s threshold for restraint toward the United States and toward Japan will not be the same either. With the United States, Beijing must weigh global finance, technology and supply chains, nuclear deterrence, and alliance dynamics. With Japan, Beijing is likewise unwilling to trigger war immediately, but its threshold for conflict may be lower. China believes that, economically or militarily, it holds greater, closer, and more usable advantages over Japan than it does over the United States, especially in the East China Sea, nearby waters, and gray-zone competition. As a result, Beijing may be more inclined in dealing with Japan to test boundaries with harder moves rather than leaving itself the wider margin it usually seeks in managing crises with Washington.
And that is where the danger lies. Neither side wants a war, but both are moving closer to conflict. Japan believes it is strengthening deterrence; China believes Japan is preparing to intervene in Taiwan. China believes it is warning and countering; Japan sees military pressure. Both call their own actions defensive yet view the other’s as offensive.
A growing number of uncertainties could drive the crisis out of control. A dangerous close encounter, a miscalculation, a fire-control radar lock, or an overreaction by a lower-level commander could all push both sides across the threshold of a conflict they want to avoid.
In the short term, both sides will still try to avoid war. But that does not mean the risk of war is falling. On the contrary, if Takaichi remains in power in the years ahead and continues her nationalist, openly hostile-to-China line, the strategic confrontation between China and Japan will only deepen. If that trajectory holds, a serious clash—whether in the East China Sea, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, or even around Okinawa itself—is increasingly difficult to rule out.
