German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has adopted a cautious approach when dealing with U.S. President Donald Trump, but one day last month, Merz couldn’t hold back. At an event in his home region of the Sauerland, Merz went off script, appearing to criticize the United States over its failure in the Iran war (leaving unstated that he has effectively facilitated U.S. operations via the Ramstein Air Base in Germany). Trump retaliated by ordering the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from the more than 35,000 based in Germany and canceling a planned deployment of long-range missiles that Germany desperately needs to deter Russia.
While Merz’s provocation may have been unnecessary, the underlying problem between the United States and Europe is still Trump’s desire to pivot militarily away from Europe—and Merz is undeniably part of the solution. He has taken on the onerous task of rearming Germany with a commitment to spend hundreds of billions of euros to build what will become the strongest conventional European army, despite opposition from war-weary Germans and broader European suspicions against the biggest economy also turning into a military superpower. Germany has also vowed to meet new NATO defense targets ahead of schedule, years before the United Kingdom and France.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has adopted a cautious approach when dealing with U.S. President Donald Trump, but one day last month, Merz couldn’t hold back. At an event in his home region of the Sauerland, Merz went off script, appearing to criticize the United States over its failure in the Iran war (leaving unstated that he has effectively facilitated U.S. operations via the Ramstein Air Base in Germany). Trump retaliated by ordering the withdrawal of 5,000 troops from the more than 35,000 based in Germany and canceling a planned deployment of long-range missiles that Germany desperately needs to deter Russia.
While Merz’s provocation may have been unnecessary, the underlying problem between the United States and Europe is still Trump’s desire to pivot militarily away from Europe—and Merz is undeniably part of the solution. He has taken on the onerous task of rearming Germany with a commitment to spend hundreds of billions of euros to build what will become the strongest conventional European army, despite opposition from war-weary Germans and broader European suspicions against the biggest economy also turning into a military superpower. Germany has also vowed to meet new NATO defense targets ahead of schedule, years before the United Kingdom and France.
But there is a new sense of shock and dismay in Germany at Trump’s latest troop-withdrawal policy. Berlin now feels pressure to speed up recruitment, acquire key capabilities, and simultaneously search for ways to make up for its absence of deep-strike capabilities. It is also preparing to deal with the domestic and regional fallout from attempts to accelerate its existing military buildup.
For now, Germany’s policy is to discourage Washington’s troop withdrawal and hope that, if not Trump himself, then people around him will recognize the challenges of the proposal to move troops from Germany to elsewhere in Europe. Three German experts emphasized the impracticality of the United States uprooting thousands of troops and their families.
“There was talk of relocating the 2nd Cavalry Bavaria regiment, but perhaps the U.S. has come to realize it is very difficult,” Rafael Loss, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), told Foreign Policy. “Many of those formations have been there for decades, with housing and training grounds to support them permanently.”
“Deployments on NATO’s eastern flank last nine months,” Loss added, which isn’t suitable for family life. “And the training infrastructure is rudimentary,” he said, explaining why Poland wasn’t a suitable option for redeployment either and that the soldiers were perhaps better off in Germany.
At a broader level, there is an understanding in Germany that a U.S. troop reduction is inevitable at some point, even if it is postponed.
“We know that adjustments will take place. The U.S. has to pivot more toward, for example, Asia,” NATO chief Mark Rutte told reporters in May. “This will take place over time and in a structured way,” so as not to hurt NATO’s defense plans.
Loss said the main concern around troop withdrawal is the impact on NATO plans that are in place to defend against Russian aggression. “The NATO force model is the underlying planning assumption for reinforcing Europe, especially front-line states with troops from across the alliance. It stipulates deployment of about 100,000 troops in 10 days, wherever they need to be, 300,000 in 30 days, and 800,000 in 180 days.” U.S. troops, he said, were far better trained and war-ready than their German or European counterparts.
Germany faces an uphill task in bolstering its numbers because conscientious opposition to joining the armed forces remains widespread, even though an increase in recruitment has been reported. According to Germany’s updated military strategy, the country must increase its troop count to 260,000 active personnel and an additional 200,000 reservists to be called on in the event of war. However, thus far, it has struggled to meet the previous target of a little more than 200,000 troops, with the total count still about 186,000.
Experts said an even bigger challenge than recruiting Germans to join the army is the absence of long-range strike capabilities in the country, which places it in Russia’s firing line. Since Russia stationed Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave on the Baltic Sea between Poland and Lithuania, from where they can hit Berlin, Germany has felt exposed and vulnerable.
Berlin is desperately trying to revive the deal and even appealed to Trump’s transactional side. It has offered to buy Tomahawk cruise missiles at a premium. Reports say that the German defense minister is planning to visit Washington to persuade the United States to sell the Tomahawks. but he would only travel if his U.S. counterpart, Pete Hegseth, agreed to meet. No meeting has yet taken place. Moreover, there are fears that the United States may not have enough to spare after expending them in large quantities in the Iran war. Merz himself admitted in early May that the Americans “do not have enough for themselves right now.”
Experts such as Loss, from ECFR, have called on Europeans to “redouble their efforts to acquire sovereign long-range weapons.” Several years ago, Germany and several other countries launched a joint initiative to develop long-range cruise missiles via the European Long-Range Strike Approach, but that will take years to become operational. Loss recommended that Europeans pair available air- or sea-launched cruise missiles, such as Storm Shadow, Taurus, or the French Naval Cruise Missiles, with range-extension boosters. This would enable them to strike deeper inside Russian territory—such as military headquarters, ammunition factories, or airfields—thereby balancing the threat from Iskander missiles.
“We need to look at what already exists in the EU inventory, like Taurus and Storm Shadow, and develop a booster that can launch it at greater distances, presumably from ground,” Loss told Foreign Policy.
Yet the most critical challenge that Germany faces is winning the confidence of fellow Europeans who remain highly skeptical of how Berlin might act once it has acquired hard power—above and beyond their own. One idea being discussed is a “coalition of the willing” within Europe: a partnership grouping of equals such as Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom.
Analysts believe that even within this small group, at least France and Poland are suspicious of Germany’s military rise and whether it solves the problem of overdependence on the United States or creates a local hegemon. Germany might be required to relinquish dominance in such an alliance, share industrial secrets and intellectual property, and make its equipment interoperable with allies.
In a recent op-ed, historian Timothy Garton Ash noted that Germany’s neighbors are wondering, “will there be a genuinely integrated European defence industry or still just rival national ones?”
For now, Germany is still trying to find out what Washington’s plans are. Part of the problem may be that the U.S. government itself doesn’t know. In May, NATO’s U.S. commander tried to assuage concerns by assuring that troop withdrawals would take place gradually over time, implying that NATO’s existing defense plans were under no danger. But days later, in a volte-face, Trump announced that the new deployment of a brigade to Poland would go ahead imminently, implying that troop numbers would be reduced correspondingly in Germany.
In Trump’s world, U.S. policy lacks certainty and leaves allies guessing. It is a world where he can expose allies to real security threats if he feels jilted, criticized, or has a mood swing. The best that the Europeans can do is speed up their preparations, as Germany is doing.
