The largess went only so far, however. Often, the cash just plugged holes in budgets, and many of the infrastructure projects begun are delayed or over cost. In 2019, the president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, called the European Green Deal the essential underpinning for the union’s long-term prosperity. Yet faced with both sustained resistance from climate-skeptic parties and pressure to expand military production, the bloc eventually watered down targets, including the planned phaseout of petrol cars. That was of a piece with the postpandemic funds, which yielded only stop-start progress in diversifying energy sources.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a key turning point — and another missed opportunity. In response, the European Union cut economic ties with Moscow and sought to replace Russian gas altogether. Initially, European leaders pledged that would help accelerate the green transition and lead to greater energy independence. In practice, though, they turned to short-term fixes like hugely increasing gas supplies from the United States; some states even favored sticking with Russia. Germany shut its nuclear reactors while others, such as France, went the opposite way.
The war had another deleterious effect. As E.U. states wavered over aid to Ukraine, rearmament took on a life of its own. Across the continent, raising military spending became common sense. The shift is especially visible in Germany where, after the 2025 election, mainstream parties lifted limits on public spending — but only in connection to the military and related infrastructure. At the European level, defense started to edge out the Green Deal as the main purpose for collective borrowing. Programs like ReArmEurope and SAFE are now the focus.
Could this be a form of military Keynesianism? The €150 billion in SAFE loans are meant to stimulate reindustrialization and create jobs, after all, rather than just pay for weapons. The early evidence, however, barely supports these hopes. What’s more, some countries have been reluctant to take up the program. The biggest SAFE recipient, Poland, is roiled in conflict over whether to focus its military budget on European production or its existing U.S. and South Korean suppliers. In Rome, Ms. Meloni has started to back out of a planned €15 billion in SAFE loans, saying Italy’s pressing need is for help with energy costs.
The consequences are clear. After failing to parlay the postpandemic funds into long-term energy independence and a sustainable economic revamp, European leaders put forward remilitarization as the bloc’s unifying cause and underlying strategy. But unlike a full-throated green reindustrialization plan, it neither creates jobs in bulk nor mitigates against the price shocks that are so troubling European citizens. Nor do frustrated voters seem to be rewarding their leaders’ posture as defenders of their security. Instead, rising numbers are cynical and alienated — and increasingly drawn to the far right.
