America’s spending on the war in Iran will far outlast active combat. The U.S. government has already made contracts and other commitments to repair damaged bases, field counter-drone platforms, feed and shelter thousands of troops and replenish munitions.
Even if President Trump signs a deal ending the war tomorrow, we will harden bases in Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, by reinforcing aircraft shelters, building blast walls around fuel and communications nodes, replacing destroyed satellite communications equipment and installing layered defense systems to defeat Iranian drones — the kind that killed six Americans in Kuwait. We will monitor for years Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and the Strait of Hormuz with carrier strike groups, destroyers and intelligence assets. Also, the U.S. military will have to replenish its munitions stockpiles: The war has burned through U.S. supplies of offensive missiles such as Tomahawks, used to strike Iranian ground targets, and defensive Patriot and THAAD interceptor systems, deployed to halt an onslaught of thousands of Iranian drones.
I worked for a decade in the Defense Department’s inspector general’s office, conducting oversight of the sorts of conflicts that the United States so often finds itself in — ones that are easy to start and hard to end, just like this one. The Pentagon calls wars such as these “overseas contingency operations,” a misnomer that hides their true nature: long, stubborn conflicts marked by changing objectives, cost overruns, fraud and waste. The risk is high that the public will not understand how much the Iran conflict will cost and that a lot of money will be wasted, either lining the pockets of fraudsters or paying for things that are marginal to the mission.
Congress should force the Trump administration to provide full, regular transparency on what it has signed up the nation to pay. And it needs to be clear with the American people how well the government is using the billions it is set to spend.
The best path forward is to tap a special inspector general to estimate costs, audit contracts, investigate fraud, inspect logistics chains and track whether stated objectives are met. The conflict in Iraq and Syria has one, as do the conflicts in Afghanistan and Ukraine. While I was with the Pentagon inspector general’s office, we created a website that provides the public information on funding and other oversight work relating to America’s support of Ukraine in its war against Russia.
The Iran war has neither a special inspector general nor a public website explaining how much is being spent and on what.
Federal lawmakers know they cannot count on executive branch officials for a straight answer about this war’s cost. Russell Vought, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, told the House Budget Committee on April 15, “I don’t have a ballpark for you.” It is incredible for him to claim that he has no general sense of the Iran war’s cost so far. Many people, including in the government, have been counting.
The Pentagon told Congress that the first six days of the war cost more than $11.3 billion. The Center for Strategic and International Studies calculated that munitions consumed 84 cents of every dollar spent on the Iran conflict in the opening 100 hours, as the U.S. military burned through Tomahawk, Patriot and THAAD inventories. With over 50,000 U.S. troops deployed in the region and about 13,000 strikes against Iran, the American Enterprise Institute estimated the cost at between $25 billion and $35 billion.
And that’s before the long-tail contracts that follow every war. Those costs can be enormous, and we need to anticipate them.
In 2014, the United States began its operation to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The so-called caliphate fell in 2019. Yet Congress enacted $11.5 billion for the operation across fiscal years 2024 and 2025 — six years after ISIS was supposedly defeated. The lead inspector general filed his latest quarterly report this February, in the operation’s 12th year.
Over 17 years, the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction documented $26 billion in waste, secured 171 criminal convictions and recovered almost $1.7 billion in criminal fines and other savings to the U.S. government. And the spending on this conflict is not done. Most Americans think the war in Afghanistan ended in 2021. Active combat did. Thirty-two days after the U.S. pullout, a new operation began — the Defense Department’s over-the-horizon counterterrorism mission to contain terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan, conducted mainly from bases in Qatar. In fiscal year 2025, about four years after the fall of Kabul, the Defense Department’s comptroller reported that the mission’s obligations exceeded $4.2 billion.
For Ukraine, the Pentagon inspector general found that the Navy outspent its funding by $399 million in a single fiscal year. A separate audit found $1.1 billion in questioned costs across 323 payments. Another evaluation discovered that most of the weapons sent to the Ukrainians had not been properly inventoried.
Congress should designate one person — the Pentagon’s inspector general — to lead aggressive and continuing oversight of the whole government’s Iran war effort, providing ample funding for this work in every supplemental war appropriations measure it approves.
Congress should also ensure that the Iran war’s watchdogs have real power, giving them subpoena authority to prompt government agencies to fix problems the auditors find. As of this month, there were over 1,400 open recommendations for the Department of Defense. In December, the Pentagon failed its eighth consecutive financial audit. This department has requested another $200 billion for its war in Iran and cannot account for the funding it already has.
The Iran war is not just about treasure. Thirteen American service members have died and more than 380 have been wounded. Good oversight would hold the government accountable for both. As a Navy Reserve officer recalled to active duty in April 2023, I supported the rescue of 70 U.S. Embassy staff and their families from Sudan as that country collapsed into civil war. The capabilities that made the rescue possible — the airlift, the intelligence, the precision logistics, the access to partner bases — are what inspectors general assess and protect.
The money is already flowing. The oversight must come.
Haider Ali Hussein Mullick served in the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General from 2016 to 2026 as senior oversight adviser and then as director of strategic initiatives. A U.S. Navy Reserve officer, he teaches public policy and national security at Georgetown University.
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