In yet another software supply chain attack, threat actors have compromised the popular GitHub Actions workflow, actions-cool/issues-helper, to run malicious code that harvests sensitive credentials and exfiltrates them to an attacker-controlled server.
“Every existing tag in the repository has been moved to point to an imposter commit that does not appear in the action’s normal commit history,” StepSecurity researcher Varun Sharma said. “That commit contains malicious code that exfiltrates credentials from CI/CD pipelines that run the action.”
An imposter commit refers to a deceptive software supply chain attack strategy in which malicious code is injected into a project by referencing a commit or tag that exists only in an adversary-controlled fork, rather than the original trusted repository. As a result, attackers can bypass standard Pull Request (PR) reviews and achieve arbitrary code execution.
The imposter commit, per the cybersecurity company, contains code that, upon being executed within a GitHub Actions runner, performs a series of actions –
- Downloads the Bun JavaScript runtime to the runner.
- Reads memory from the Runner.Worker process to extract credentials.
- Makes an outbound HTTPS call to an attacker-controlled domain (“t.m-kosche[.]com”) to transmit the stolen data.
StepSecurity said 15 tags associated with a second GitHub action, “actions-cool/maintain-one-comment” have also been compromised with the same functionality.
GitHub has since disabled access to the repository due to a “violation of GitHub’s terms of service.” It’s currently not known what led the Microsoft-owned subsidiary to this decision.
Interestingly, the exfiltration domain “t.m-kosche[.]com” has been observed in the latest wave of the Mini Shai-Hulud campaign targeting npm packages from the @antv ecosystem, indicating the two clusters of activity could be related.
“Because every tag now resolves to malicious commits, any workflow that references the action by version pulls the malicious code on its next run,” StepSecurity said. “Only workflows pinned to a known-good full commit SHA are unaffected.”
