“Our Europe is mortal,” French President Emmanuel Macron warned his audience at the Sorbonne in 2024. “It can die, and it all depends on our choices.”
Macron’s doom and gloom is not far-fetched. Liberal democracy and the rule of law are in retreat, including in Europe itself. European Union-style multilateral governance and win-win economic integration, underpinned by jointly agreed norms, are no longer en vogue in a world where strongman-led great powers vie for influence. Once a lynchpin of the old order, the United States now bears more resemblance to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey than to Scandinavian countries enamored with democratic accountability. Meanwhile, nativists and populists are making electoral gains across the EU—and also in the United Kingdom—calling for renationalizing politics and undoing globalization and European integration.
“Our Europe is mortal,” French President Emmanuel Macron warned his audience at the Sorbonne in 2024. “It can die, and it all depends on our choices.”
Macron’s doom and gloom is not far-fetched. Liberal democracy and the rule of law are in retreat, including in Europe itself. European Union-style multilateral governance and win-win economic integration, underpinned by jointly agreed norms, are no longer en vogue in a world where strongman-led great powers vie for influence. Once a lynchpin of the old order, the United States now bears more resemblance to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey than to Scandinavian countries enamored with democratic accountability. Meanwhile, nativists and populists are making electoral gains across the EU—and also in the United Kingdom—calling for renationalizing politics and undoing globalization and European integration.
This article has been adapted from The Scramble for Europe: Russia, China, and Turkey Challenging Regional Order by Dimitar Bechev (Oxford University Press, 224 pp., $29.99, July 2026).
Discord between the United States and Europe coupled with the populist challenge from within has certainly blunted Europeans’ ambitions and capacity to act externally. Europe once set out to change the world in its own image. These days, its inherent vulnerability makes it fair game to outside poachers.
But while Europe has been buffeted by a host of external rivals, it has also shown a remarkable capacity to adapt. Looking at the different strategies it has embraced to deal with three rivals—Russia, China, and Turkey—shows how.
The similarities between Russia, China, and Turkey have been much remarked on. All three countries share imperial pasts and, to various degrees, retain imperial characteristics. Legacy of empire is Janus-faced: It includes memory of grandeur but also grievance over decline and loss, typically with the West playing the part of historical villain. And the three countries are all ruled by authoritarian strongmen: Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, and Erdogan. For many commentators, these figures are emblematic of a new era of great power politics that is upon us.
But while all these powers have contested Western dominance in global affairs, they have done so in different ways. Russia has used military force: in the former Soviet space but also in the Middle East and even sub-Saharan Africa. China, in turn, is seeking to transform its economic might into political influence across all parts of the globe. In its effort to rival the West, Beijing is championing an alternative governance model blending authoritarianism and technocracy, and amassing hard power to enforce its primacy in East Asia. Turkey, for its part, has effectively abandoned its long-standing aspiration to be part of the West. Instead, it is reinventing itself as a power center in its own right, while claiming leadership over Sunni Muslims in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Eurasia.
These methods are all matched to different ends. Russia wants to radically revise the European order to the point of blowing up the EU. China, by contrast, wants to see Europe sucked even more deeply into its economic orbit while remaining neutral in the continent’s escalating conflict with the United States. Turkey continues to seek inclusion in the European order, including a better deal with the EU, but on its own terms. China and Russia have also pursued change at the level of institutions: whether it is replacing the EU with a great power concert (Russia) or a hub-and-spoke arrangement centered on China, such as the 14+1 forum. Inevitably, Russia poses the most fundamental challenge, undermining the prohibition against acquiring territory by military conquest and using hard power to subjugate neighbors.
Accordingly, Europe has embarked on three distinctive strategies to resist pressure from these three powers: containment, consolidation, and co-optation. European leaders have employed military power to keep Russia from using force to achieve political objectives. At the same time, they have focused on resilience and economic sovereignty in order to “de-risk” from China. And finally, they worked to keep Turkey onside through ad hoc deals, institutional ties, and new, looser multilateral platforms, such as the European Political Community.
This toolbox does not apply exclusively to those three states. Having developed the right capabilities, Europe will be in position to deter military or “hybrid” threats coming from, for example, an Iranian missile or a North Korean cyberattack. Likewise, “de-risking” in the areas of trade and technology will prove as useful for responding to Donald Trump’s United States as to Beijing. Lastly, the EU has been applying a co-optation strategy vis-à-vis all its neighbors, from Tunisia to Azerbaijan and Moldova.
In taking these steps, Europe has not abandoned its values, but it has become a little more like its rivals. First, European states and even EU institutions are embracing hard power. The Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instruments set aside 150 billion euros for collaborative projects in the fields of security. These days, an EU commissioner keeps track of projects to develop new capabilities in areas such as satellites, sensors, cruise missiles, air defenses, and drones. Europe has recognized the need to be able to defend itself against Russia without relying on the United States—a tall order, but not an impossible objective.
Second, at a time when the United States is turning protectionist and China is eager to achieve full self-sufficiency, Europe is likewise singing the praises of “strategic autonomy.” That includes diversifying supply chains away from China, including on electronic components, critical minerals, and pharmaceuticals. The Anti-Coercion Instrument that entered into force in 2023 is intended to prevent foreign powers—largely China but potentially the United States as well—from leveraging dependency to extract political concessions.
Finally, the EU has become more comfortable using the language of power and spheres of influence in its wider region. The Ukraine war has driven home the geopolitical value of enlargement. Bringing in new members and expanding ties with neighbors is not an altruistic exercise reflecting Europe’s inherent penchant for spreading the gospel of democracy and good governance. Rather, it is a matter of security. Ukraine is already acting as a bulwark against Russia—and it is likely to stay that way for decades to come.
The ability to learn lessons and change course is not a reason to be complacent. Europe faces the herculean task of preventing a breakdown in its alliance with the United States, managing the China challenge, and stopping Russia’s renewed imperialism. It may well fail on one or more fronts.
Even if it muddles through, internal diversity and discord will prevent the EU from graduating to great power status. Europe will not single handedly save the liberal international order either. But Europe is perfectly capable of learning from negative experience, toughening up, and protecting itself in a world that runs counter to its values and interests. In the age of Trump, Xi, and Putin, there is no other choice. As Mark Carney, Canada’s prime minister, reminded the audience at the World Economic Forum in Davos, middle powers need to join forces in order to be at the table. Otherwise, they will be on the menu.
