Myanmar officially has a new president—and unsurprisingly, it is former Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who has led the country’s military junta since it took power in a coup against the elected government in February 2021. Min Aung Hlaing’s transition to supposedly civilian leadership represents the culmination of an attempt to legitimize and rebrand the regime, which remains locked in a bloody civil war.
Myanmar held its first parliamentary election since the coup from Dec. 28 to Jan. 25, which outside observers widely considered a sham. Opposition groups and ethnic minorities were prevented from going to the polls. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party dominated, along with another large block of candidates supported by the junta.
Myanmar officially has a new president—and unsurprisingly, it is former Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, who has led the country’s military junta since it took power in a coup against the elected government in February 2021. Min Aung Hlaing’s transition to supposedly civilian leadership represents the culmination of an attempt to legitimize and rebrand the regime, which remains locked in a bloody civil war.
Myanmar held its first parliamentary election since the coup from Dec. 28 to Jan. 25, which outside observers widely considered a sham. Opposition groups and ethnic minorities were prevented from going to the polls. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party dominated, along with another large block of candidates supported by the junta.
With the new parliament under his thumb, the next step was for Min Aung Hlaing to shed his military uniform and become president. Last month, he did just this—handing over command of Myanmar’s armed forces to his top spy chief, Ye Win Oo. As a final imprimatur, this friendly parliament elected Min Aung Hlaing to the presidency on April 3.
Rather than signaling a genuine political opening, this tightly choreographed transition reflects a familiar authoritarian playbook: repackage military rule in civilian clothing to ease international pressure, reengage with regional partners, and project an image of stability that belies the conflict still raging across the country.
Myanmar’s moves have consequences for its position within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The election, as well as the appointment of Min Aung Hlaing as president, will only reinforce the view among other members—Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, at a minimum—that the organization must fully renormalize its relations with Myanmar, bringing the country back into the fold. This process has already begun, but Min Aung Hlaing’s new role is likely to hasten it.
In April 2021, a few months after Myanmar’s coup, ASEAN—at the time chaired by Brunei—agreed to the Five-Point Consensus on the crisis, which urged an immediate end to violence, constructive dialogue among all parties, mediation by an ASEAN special envoy, humanitarian aid, and a visit to Myanmar by the special envoy. In practice, without a resolution or at least a cease-fire in its internal conflict, Myanmar has been blocked from participating in regional proceedings.
That hasn’t stopped some ASEAN members from bilaterally engaging with the military regime. During its ASEAN chairmanship in 2022, Cambodia sent Prime Minister Hun Sen to Myanmar’s capital, Naypyidaw, for negotiations on bringing the country back into the bloc, making him the first foreign leader to visit since the coup. During their meeting, Hun Sen invited Min Aung Hlaing to attend that year’s ASEAN summit if there was progress on the Five-Point Consensus—but absent that, he would have to send “non-political representatives” in his place.
Cambodia’s efforts failed for a variety of reasons but mainly because it misread Myanmar’s intentions. The junta wanted international legitimacy without having to reciprocate with concessions. Meanwhile, Cambodia’s push was hamstrung by the lack of a cease-fire or a return to dialogue with the ousted civilian government—at the core of the Five-Point Consensus—and trying to get around the consensus drove a wedge within ASEAN.
As ASEAN chair in 2024, Laos also attempted to engage directly with the junta, albeit even more quietly. Through the bloc’s consensus statement that year, the Laotian foreign ministry simply noted that all parties “reaffirmed ASEAN’s commitment to assisting Myanmar.” The vague statement still put ASEAN on the hook to engage with Myanmar, demonstrating its tacit support for the country and possibly the regime, despite the challenging circumstances.
Vietnam’s approach has been similar: saying very little and maintaining diplomatic and security ties with Myanmar while backing ASEAN statements.
Thailand has been more explicit about the need to keep an open line with Myanmar’s leaders. Last year, Thailand’s foreign minister noted that the country would advocate for more international engagement with Myanmar, and Bangkok has walked the walk: Senior Thai officials have visited Naypyidaw to negotiate directly with their Myanmar counterparts, discussing border stability, curbing online scams, and restoring trade.
Furthermore, Thailand has hosted at least one regional meeting on the crisis in Myanmar involving the junta and its non-ASEAN neighbors, including Bangladesh, China, and India. All three countries share land borders with Myanmar and are thus disproportionately affected by the ongoing civil war.
However, those members opposed to bringing Myanmar back into ASEAN’s graces are equal in number and unambiguously include Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the bloc’s newest member, Timor-Leste. These countries generally advocate strict enforcement of the Five-Point Consensus as the only viable path to compel the military regime to end its violence and allow the ousted government to return.
Worryingly, the Philippines—normally in alignment with the members that support the primacy of the Five-Point Consensus—has recently shown an interest in prioritizing direct talks with the regime. The Philippines became the ASEAN chair at the start of the year. In a surprise visit to Naypyidaw in January, Philippine Foreign Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro seemed out of step with the ASEAN position reaffirmed last year, which emphasized that “the cessation of violence and inclusive political dialogue must precede elections.”
Yet Lazaro visited Myanmar during the elections without any concessions from the junta, sparking frustration and surprise among fellow ASEAN members about whether the Philippines is moving the needle toward recognizing the military regime. Like Lazaro, previous ASEAN special envoys have met with Min Aung Hlaing, per the Five-Point Consensus. The problem was both the timing of the meeting and the perception among other ASEAN members that Manila is favoring engagement with the regime over the civilian opposition. Though the optics were poor, the Philippines remains broadly aligned with the Five-Point Consensus policy position.
It is nonetheless remarkable how routinely ASEAN members now interact directly with Myanmar’s junta. What started as the regional bloc’s attempt at total diplomatic isolation of the regime—and even discussions about kicking the country out of ASEAN—has faded in favor of hoping that the situation improves just enough to justify treating Myanmar like a normal member again.
The military regime is keenly aware of this dynamic, which is why it has embarked on a rebrand. This strategy is likely to bear fruit because nearly half of ASEAN’s members are already looking for a reason to reengage.
If Myanmar is brought back in from the cold, major powers will likely welcome the outcome. As China sees it, ASEAN could help preserve stability in Myanmar and enable Belt and Road projects to resume there. The decision would serve Russia well because the regime in Naypyidaw has grown close to Moscow, especially in the context of arms sales and defense cooperation. India would also welcome the change; it has already held bilateral negotiations with Myanmar to manage cross-border and ethnic violence in its neighboring states.
As for the United States, the Trump administration would like to see Myanmar’s civil war come to an end or at least a pause—not necessarily because of the atrocities being committed but for the purposes of engaging with the regime to secure U.S. national interests, such as critical minerals extraction.
ASEAN’s retreat on Myanmar is no longer hypothetical. Though the bloc continues to invoke the Five-Point Consensus rhetorically, a growing number of its members are bypassing it through bilateral engagement, recalibrating their policies around stability and national interests rather than political conditions. Myanmar’s leaders recognize and are exploiting this shift, repackaging military rule to create just enough ambiguity for ASEAN states to justify reengagement.
The result is a slow but steady normalization of relations with the junta, largely because ASEAN’s unity has frayed and its leverage has diminished; it is also being egged on by major powers outside the bloc. If current trends hold, Myanmar’s eventual reintegration will not mark a diplomatic breakthrough but simply formalize a reality: ASEAN has adjusted to the junta, not the other way around.
