One of the United States’ most important strategic partners in Southeast Asia—Singapore—is beginning to lose faith in the Trump administration. U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs, coupled with the acute energy crisis caused by his war against Iran and U.S. government pressure to force Singapore into even closer alignment, have severely frustrated Singaporean leaders. As Singapore seeks a stable place in an increasingly disorderly international system, this could result in a more diversified Singaporean foreign policy, including a more prominent role for China.
Alienating Singapore would be an unforced error—and perhaps a significant one. The city-state sits on a small island strategically located on the vital Strait of Malacca that connects the Indian and Pacific oceans, and it serves as a de facto security ally of the United States. Singapore hosts and maintains U.S. warships at its Changi Naval Base and participates in a range of other military agreements, making it a potentially critical node of support to U.S. military forces defending Taiwan or addressing any number of other future contingencies throughout the Indo-Pacific. Singapore is also a firm supporter of the rules-based international order, which has allowed it to benefit from both free and open trade.
One of the United States’ most important strategic partners in Southeast Asia—Singapore—is beginning to lose faith in the Trump administration. U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs, coupled with the acute energy crisis caused by his war against Iran and U.S. government pressure to force Singapore into even closer alignment, have severely frustrated Singaporean leaders. As Singapore seeks a stable place in an increasingly disorderly international system, this could result in a more diversified Singaporean foreign policy, including a more prominent role for China.
Alienating Singapore would be an unforced error—and perhaps a significant one. The city-state sits on a small island strategically located on the vital Strait of Malacca that connects the Indian and Pacific oceans, and it serves as a de facto security ally of the United States. Singapore hosts and maintains U.S. warships at its Changi Naval Base and participates in a range of other military agreements, making it a potentially critical node of support to U.S. military forces defending Taiwan or addressing any number of other future contingencies throughout the Indo-Pacific. Singapore is also a firm supporter of the rules-based international order, which has allowed it to benefit from both free and open trade.
As he has done with so many of Washington’s friends, Trump is needlessly straining bilateral ties. In the latest example from this week, his Office of the U.S. Trade Representative released the findings of its Section 301 investigation into alleged forced labor practices in Singapore and concluded that the country was in fact culpable and that U.S. importers should pay an additional 12.5 percent tariff on all Singapore an products they buy. In April, Singapore’s Ministry of Trade and Industry had rejected the Trump administration’s claims as lacking evidence, but the investigation proceeded nonetheless. Singapore is also the subject of a separate Section 301 investigation related to alleged structural excess capacity and production in certain manufacturing sectors.
The common perception—not just in Singapore—is that the “forced labor” investigations, which have ensnared dozens of nations, including several others in Southeast Asia, are entirely illegitimate. Rather, they are the administration’s attempt to find a new avenue for Trump to unilaterally levy tariffs after the U.S. Supreme Court in February ruled against his so-called reciprocal tariffs. The legal rationale for those original tariffs was similarly contrived.
To be sure, Trump in April 2025 subjected Singapore only to his universal baseline tariff of 10 percent and not the various higher-ranging tariff rates, but Singaporean leaders were nevertheless extremely frustrated. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, who is typically very cautious in his language and avoids directly criticizing any other nation, remarked at the time that Singapore was “very disappointed by the U.S. move” and that “these are not actions one does to a friend.”
What was particularly galling for Singapore is that the data actually shows that it is Singapore, not the United States, that has a trade deficit—which once again calls into question Trump’s stated motives for his tariffs. For this reason, Singapore was certainly happy about the U.S. Court of International Trade’s decision to strike down Trump’s Section 122 tariffs in May. Singapore did not publicly respond to the ruling, suggesting that it seeks to avoid debates with Washington and simply return to the rules-based global trading system that Singapore has depended on for its survival.
Meanwhile, Trump’s war against Iran has put additional unwanted pressure on Singapore. Although the country’s wealth has allowed it to largely avoid the fuel shortages seen elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the crisis has exposed its enduring energy vulnerabilities. The disruption of Gulf energy supplies has raised fuel and electricity costs, increased inflationary pressures, threatened Singapore’s refining and trading hub functions, and highlighted the risks of relying on imported natural gas for approximately 95 percent of electricity generation. Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong warned Parliament that the conflict would raise inflation and slow economic growth. Singapore subsequently introduced a nearly $800 million support package to cushion households and businesses from rising energy costs.
The crisis has further highlighted the acute vulnerabilities of Singapore’s geography. As I’ve previously written in Foreign Policy, there are too many uncomfortable parallels between the Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca in terms of the economic havoc a blockade might wreak on commercial shipping and supply chains. As a heavily trade-dependent nation, Singapore worries about this often.
Trump’s inability to prevent Iran from seizing control over an ostensibly international waterway has also led other nations to believe that controlling their respective straits by levying fees for traversing them might not be such a bad idea, even if it’s contrary to long-standing international law and norms of behavior. In April, Indonesia—which, along with Singapore and Malaysia, also sits on the Strait of Malacca—briefly proposed a plan to establish a toll for ships using the strait, along the lines of the Iranian plans. Jakarta planned to share the revenue with its two neighbors, but Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan immediately and in unusually direct language shot down the proposal. “The right of transit passage is guaranteed for everyone,” he said. “We will not participate in any attempts to close or interdict or to impose tolls in our neighborhood.” Indonesia dropped the idea within 24 hours, but from Singapore’s perspective, the damage had already been done: Not only free but even open trade is now negotiable, whereas before Trump, it was not.
On the security side, all appears normal on the surface. But this is hardly the case. Following U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s speech last weekend at the annual Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, the city-state is increasingly concerned that the Trump administration’s approach to China is narrowing the strategic space available to smaller states. Although U.S. officials have not explicitly demanded that Singapore choose sides, Washington’s emphasis on “model allies,” greater burden-sharing, and collective efforts to counter China’s growing influence has reinforced Singaporean fears that the region is drifting toward rival blocs.
This is something that Singaporean officials have consistently railed against in the past. Balakrishnan, for example, said last year that his country was pursuing “omni-directional engagement … with all the multiple poles of power that are emerging.” Singapore is trying to remain out of U.S.-China competition, even as the Trump administration tries to pull allies and partners into greater alignment to potentially confront Beijing.
For decades, Singapore has sought to avoid a binary choice between Washington and Beijing, even if it tends to be aligned with the former. Trump may not be explicitly demanding a stricter alignment, but his policies are steadily narrowing the space for Singapore to maintain its own version of balance. The danger for the United States is not that Singapore suddenly pivots toward China. It is that Singapore gradually diversifies its diplomatic, economic, and strategic relationships in ways that reduce U.S. influence over time. At a moment when Washington is competing with Beijing for influence across the Indo-Pacific, testing the patience of one of its most reliable partners is a risk the United States does not need to take.
This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here.
